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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 1993, the United Nations Security Council
("Security Council" or "Council") unanimously adopted Resolu-
tion 827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").1 The Court's mandate is to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
t Dr. Franca Baroni holds a J.D. Equivalent and a Doctorate in Law from the
University of Basle, Switzerland, and a Master in Comparative Law (L.L.M.) from
the University of Miami. She is a Member of the New York Bar since 1999.
1 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., 3217 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) (ICTY Statute Resolution). The author uses the words "ICTY'," "Court" and
"Tribunal" interchangeably throughout this article.
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tional humanitarian law committed in that territory since
1991.2 The creation of the Yugoslavia Tribunal was most cer-
tainly a breakthrough in the enforcement of international hu-
manitarian law and marked the beginning of a new era in
international criminal justice. The focus of these remarks is on
the usefulness and effectiveness of the ICTY as an instrument
to restore peace to a deeply conflicted, blood-drenched arena.
After some introductory remarks, I will briefly describe the
broad context in which the Court was created and give an over-
view of its normative impact. Then, most importantly, I will
discuss the Court's role in bringing peace to the area. Consider-
ing the space constraints and the vastness of the subject, major
issues must inevitably be left out of my discussion, and this is
especially true with regard to the normative impact of the
Court, which alone is a very broad and technical subject. 3
I would like to begin with a brief definition of international
humanitarian law that can be defined as the human rights com-
ponent of the law of war.4 It "attempts to place limitations upon
the conduct of warfare to prevent unnecessary suffering of civil-
ians and combatants."5 It applies to international conflicts,
and, to a more limited but growing extent, to internal armed
conflicts. The principal sources of international humanitarian
law are to be found in customary law and various treaties. 6 The
major treaties are the Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting
the Law and Customs of War on Land and annexed Regulations
of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its two addi-
tional Protocols of 1977.
2 See id.
3 For further discussion, see THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF
AGE: ESSAYS (1998); Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1999);
M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1997); Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian
Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265 (1996); Walter G. Scharp, Sr.,
International Obligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government
Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411 (1996-1997).
4 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 249 (1995).
5 LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 154 (1998).
6 MERON, supra note 3, at 262.
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II. CONTEXT OF THE TRIBUNAL'S CREATION
In the last fifty years, international humanitarian law has
gradually shifted from an interstate to a more moral, human
rights approach. Under the state-centric regime criminal prose-
cution of violators of humanitarian law was mostly a domestic
matter, which resulted in most of the crimes going unpunished.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals established in-
dividual culpability for international crimes. 7 However, those
were military courts, which were considered to be institutions of
the victorious powers of WWII rather than a model for perma-
nent enforcement of humanitarian law.8 In contrast, the Yugo-
slavia Court reflects the recognition that individuals are
subjects in their own right and that state sovereignty can no
longer serve as a shield.9 This development has been en-
couraged by two major factors. First, the growing interdepen-
dence of the international community, reflected in an extended
coverage of the horrifying events in the media, made the atroci-
ties an issue of international concern calling for a global solu-
tion. Second, with the end of the Cold War the Security Council
has begun to increasingly resort to Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter as a basis for action in cases of gross violations of
human rights, defining mass killings and humanitarian emer-
gencies as threats to international peace and security. 10 Under
Chapter VII, the Security Council is empowered to take mea-
sures to enforce its decisions either by imposing non-military
sanctions or authorizing the use of force. The establishment of
the Yugoslavia Court is one example of the many innovative
measures that the Security Council has employed in enforcing
its decisions after the Cold War,1 ' creating for the first time a
direct link between accountability and peace.
7 YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JUSTICE 27, 50 (1999).
8 Id. at 39, 61.
9 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law].
10 See generally FRANCA BARONI, VOELKERRECHTLICHE AUSWIRKUNGEN DER
FRIEDENSSICHERUNGSPRAXIS DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN NACH DEM ENDE DES
KALTFN KEEGES 242-265 (1995); Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugo-
slavia Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 509 (1996).
11 See generally BARONI, supra note 10, at 57, 127-31.
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At this point, a brief discussion of a few examples of the
normative impact of the Court is appropriate. First, the crea-
tion of a judiciary body as a measure to restore peace in itself
was exceptional. Also, the Court was held to have the compe-
tence to review the Security Council's action under Chapter
VII. 12 The Court confirmed the existence of constraints of legal-
ity set forth in the U.N. Charter and in general principles of
international law such as the right to be tried by a court estab-
lished by law and the right to a fair trial limiting the Council's
authority. 13 This decision is important because it sets a prece-
dent of judicial review of Security Council's action capable of
further developments in a context where the increase in Secur-
ity Council activity under Chapter VII "has raised questions
about the purview of the Council's competence and the exis-
tence of checks and controls upon its authority."' 4 Another ex-
ample, going beyond the wording of the Geneva Conventions,
the Court found that the distinction between international and
internal conflicts, which determines the applicability of norms
of humanitarian law, is losing its value in relation to human
beings. 15 Also, going beyond the black letter of the law, the
Court acknowledged that ethnicity rather than nationality de-
termines whether civilians are protected under the Geneva
Conventions.1 6 Those decisions are very important considering
the inter-ethnic nature of modern conflicts. The Statute of the
Court' 7 includes rape,' for the first time explicitly, as a crime
against humanity and affirms the humanitarian treaties at the
basis of its jurisdiction as customary law. To summarize, the
Court has been clarifying some fundamental rules and inter-
preting critical provisions of international humanitarian law
quite expansively suggesting that it is leaning more towards an
approach that looks at law in terms of humanity and justice
12 See Decision of the Appeal Chamber in the Tadic Case, Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, reprinted in 35 IL.M. 32 (1996).
13 See King, supra note 10, at 561.
14 See id. at 511.
15 See Humanitarian Law, supra note 9, at 262.
16 Id. at 259.
"7 See Report of the Secretary-General, Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, para. 2, U. N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993).
18 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via, in id. at Annex, art. 5 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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rather than states consent and binding power realities. The ac-
tivism of the Court can be seen either as a dangerous develop-
ment jeopardizing its future credibility in application of a
conflating law or as a necessary move towards an effective pro-
tection of basic human dignity. In my opinion, considering the
increasing gratuitous violence characterizing post Cold War
conflicts, the activist role of the Tribunal is not only welcomed
but needed. Finally, the work of the Court triggered an awak-
ened public and academic interest in the field, which in turn
created a very positive environment for the adoption of the
Rome Treaty in 1998 establishing the permanent International
Criminal Court.19
III. PEACE THROUGH JUSTICE: THE GOALS AND CHALLENGES
OF THE TRIBUNAL
A. Goals Set in the Resolution 827 and Circumstances
Leading to its Adoption
Can peace be achieved through justice? In Resolution 827
the Security Council determined that the mass killings, system-
atic rape of women, and the practice of ethnic cleansing were a
threat to international peace and security and that, by bringing
to justice the individuals responsible for them, it could halt
those violations and restore peace.20 The Security Council cre-
ated the Court under the pressure of an international outcry.
The permanent Members very well knew the severity of the vio-
lations long before they took action. However, the distribution
of power was not favorable to a forceful intervention protecting
the civilians in the area. For example, the acting U.S. Secretary
of State at the end of 1992 was Eagleburger who had served as
U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia and was allegedly known to be
a former "drinking buddy" of Milosevic. 21 The many resolutions
preceding Resolution 82722 were nothing more than a moderate
19 See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. Al
CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
20 See ICTY Statute Resolution, supra note 1.
21 Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia, 6 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L., 127, 156 (1995-1996).
22 S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 4 7th Sess., 3093' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764
(1992); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 4 7th Sess., 3106 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771
(1992); S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 4 7th Sess., 3119' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
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reaction to an external pressure that, in 1993, became so strong
that the Council had no other option than to create the Court.
Consequently, there was widespread criticism that the only im-
petus to the establishment of the Court was moral guilt result-
ing from the double failure to either prevent or stop the
massacre. 23 Regardless of the motivations behind its establish-
ment, the Court has very important functions to fulfill.
B. ICTY Functions
The Tribunal has the following functions: first, public and
official acknowledgment to the victims; second, individualiza-
tion of guilt; third, establishment of a historical record; fourth,
deterrence; fifth, the de-legitimization of indicted war criminals
as political leaders. There has been a lot of skepticism regard-
ing the Court's ability to fulfill these ambitious functions. Of
course, one of the worst massacres in the region - Srebrenica in
199524 occurred quite some time after its establishment. How-
ever, we must not forget that the court's contribution to peace is
a long-term process that cannot be measured and valued in the
short run. Also, the concept of peace has to be extended beyond
the mere absence of crime in the area. Peace includes not only
the absence of direct physical violence and war, but also the
elimination of structural violence, i.e. the consequences of so-
cial, political, cultural, economic, and civil structures and insti-
tutions that lower the quality of human life. So, how can the
Court create peace?
1. Truth Finding
The establishment of the truth is an essential element in
the reconciliation process and a precondition for an enduring
peace. "Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will
point towards individuals, not peoples, as perpetrators of war
crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and
(1992); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993).
23 Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International
Criminal Adjudication, 23 FoaDHAM INT'L L. J. 440, 445 (1999).
24 In July 1995 Serb soldiers massacred thousands of Muslims living in and
around the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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religious hatreds and begin the healing process." 25 To establish
the truth is to give dignity and respect to the victims, the survi-
vors and their families who have not only a right to know,26 but
also a right to have their past recognized. This ensures that the
gross violations of human rights committed on that territory are
not distorted or denied by future leaders. 27 The Court advances
the finding of the truth by giving the victims a credible setting
in which to report their truth through testimony; and by having
their suffering formally recorded and acknowledged through the
creation of an official record. For the victims, the opportunity to
testify and to have their experiences recorded is central to their
healing process. The purpose of letting others know is transfor-
mation. To be transformed is a basis for healing and
reconciliation.
There are, however, two problems with the Court: First, the
perpetrator, and not the victim, is the primary focus of the pro-
ceedings. Since prosecutions and trials focus only on the indi-
vidual liability of perpetrators, the proceedings fall short of
telling the whole story of the abuses. This factor is inherent in
the form of justice itself. Therefore, solutions are to be found
outside the court setting. A Truth Commission that focuses
equally on victim and perpetrator could be a valuable comple-
ment in this regard. The goal of a Truth Commission is to give
a complete picture of the gross violations of human rights that
occurred and restore to victims their human and civil dignity by
letting them tell their stories.28 The weight of the victims' testi-
25 U.N. SCOR, 3217' mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993). (View expressed
by former United States Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright
during the Security Council's meeting leading to the establishment of the ICTY).
26 See Final Report on the Question of the impunity of perpetrators of viola-
tions of human rights (civil and political rights) to the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, Special Rapporteur, Louis Joinet, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20
(1997). The report laid down three fundamental rights of victims: the right to
know, the right to justice and the right to reparation. See id. Under the "right to
know" he set out the inalienable right to the truth and the duty to remember. See
id.
27 See Lord David Owen, Reconciliation: Applying Historical Lessons to Mod-
ern Conflicts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 324, 335 (1995) (explaining how the distor-
tion of truth was at the root of several wars in the former Yugoslavia).
28 See Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Com-
mission, 7 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 375 (1996); BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at
117.
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mony would not be filtered down by its criminal relevance;
rather, the victims' stories would be given full bearing and at-
tention, and would be considered to be at the core of the na-
tional reconciliation process. Even within the framework of the
Court, the status of victims needs to be improved. Although in
the past few years the Tribunal has developed a variety of inno-
vative protective measures to strengthen the status of victims
and witnesses in the proceedings, 29 the situation outside the
courtroom is more precarious. For too many witnesses, testify-
ing is a risk to their lives. The Tribunal is not based on any
territory and lacks an enforcement mechanism of its own.
Thus, outside the courtroom, there is little that the Tribunal
can do to provide practical protection to witnesses. The Tribu-
nal has established a witness protection program to relocate
witnesses to the territory of Member States. These relocations
are governed by an agreement between the Tribunal and the
State concerned. However, States have been reluctant to sign
the proposed agreements. By 1998, none of the Member States
had adopted a relocation agreement. 30 It is imperative that
Member States grant protection to those victims and witnesses
that are unable to return to their homes after testifying in The
Hague. States can achieve this objective both through a wide-
spread adoption of relocation agreements, and through the de-
velopment of social and economic witness integration programs.
Second, it is difficult to establish the meaning and weight of
truth. One could say that a court could establish a factual re-
cord but not truth, truth being a highly subjective concept. I
disagree. It is imperative that the Court provides a forum that
encourages the search for a common truth, or in the words of
Payam Akhavan, Legal Advisor to the Tribunal, a "shared truth
.. [and] an empathy for human suffering that transcends the
29 See Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INVL L. 43, 83 (1999);
Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic, The Anonymous Witness and the Sources of Interna-
tional Procedural Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445 (1998); Y.M.O. Featherstone, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Recent Developments
in Witness Protection, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 179 (1997).
30 See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, International Support for International
Criminal Tribunals & an International Criminal Court: The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1413, 1427, 1429
(1998).
[Vol. 12:233
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/2
2000] THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 241
bonds of blood and soil."31 To establish a "shared truth" is not
to impose one historical perspective of the facts but to create
some common ground on the basic human fact that people have
been massacred, raped, killed and deported from their homes.
It is about "reaching a shared truth by considering the struggle
of other people in conflict situations."32 The acknowledgment of
truth in this sense promotes reconciliation and prevents future
generations from being doomed to revisit the injustices of the
past.33 One of the most important factors in the violent break-
up of the former Yugoslavia was the revival of old hatreds
rooted in a flawed history manipulated by the political elite.
Therefore, the establishment of basic humanitarian facts by the
Tribunal can effectively hinder the recrudescence of unresolved
animosities and give new meaning and weight to the common
human experience of all parties of the conflict, thus furthering
the peace process.
2. Individualization of Guilt
Another significant contribution of the Court is to create a
basis for an interethnic reconciliation that can be achieved
through the differentiation between individual responsibilities
and collective attribution of guilt.34 To this end, the underlying
causes of the conflict have to be ascertained and publicly recog-
nized. The primordial hatred of Serbs, Croats and Muslims to-
wards each other has often been identified as the root of this
conflict. 35 It is, however, easily forgotten that Bosnia, for exam-
ple, enjoyed long periods of tranquillity as a multiethnic com-
munity. Mixed marriages, for instance, were very common.36
What happened was a tremendous instrumentalization of the
31 Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 713,
771 (1998).
32 Id. at 771.
33 Id. at 773 (citing Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, in Index on Censorship
(Sept./Oct. 1996), reprinted in 294 HARPER'S MAG. 15 (Mar. 1997)).
34 Id. at 742.
35 Id. at 753.
36 See Bosnet: Elections Coverage: Reactions to Bosnic Elections, Sept. 25,
1998, at http://www.bosnet.orgarchive/bosnet.w3archive/9809/msgOO076.html; see
International Organization for Migration, at http://www.iom.int/iom/Publications/
books-studies-surveys/MIPBelgium-yugos-dp-eng.htm. (visited Oct. 21, 2000).
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ethnic differences by the political 6lite in power.37 The civilian
population was, until very recently, manipulated through hate
propaganda. The leaders played with core fears deeply rooted
in the human psyche for power and control achieved through
separation. Divide et impera is still very much alive. 38 In vari-
ous degrees, the international community bought into the belief
that primordial hatred was at the root of the atrocities and that
there was nothing anyone could really do about it. This conve-
niently excused us from the responsibilities of intervening. In
truth, the systematic gross abuses were not a consequence of
primordial hatred, but a design that required a high degree of
centralized authority. 39 In this context, it is essential that the
Court establishes individual guilt as opposed to collective re-
sponsibilities that easily degenerate into resentment and ven-
geance. The international criminal justice system can credibly
support the peace process only if it emphasizes the role of indi-
vidual leaders in fomenting hatred and inciting acts of brutal-
ity, revealing their personal human responsibility. Accordingly,
the Statute of the Tribunal provides that "the official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government (),
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor miti-
gate punishment."40 Through the individual indictment of the
most senior leaders of the former Yugoslavia, Radovan
Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Slobodan Milosevic, the Tribunal
has sanctioned political leaders who ordered the massacre, be-
ing held individually accountable for their decisions, and invali-
dated the cover of the abstract, irresponsible state. Moreover,
the Court's mandate to prosecute persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of humanitarian law, whether public figures or
private citizens, limits state authority by setting clear limita-
tions to the once nearly unrestrained immunity of high level
state officials. Individuals in power can no longer hide behind
the shield of national sovereignty and escape criminal accounta-
bility. State authority is thus separated from and restricted by
individual authorities. However, the recent public remarks of
some leaders suggesting the desirability of granting Milosevic
37 Akhavan, supra note 31, at 760.
38 Latin for divide and conquer.
39 See Akhavan, supra note 31, at 756.
40 ICTY Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7.2.
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immunity in return for his resignation shows that the primacy
of international justice over state authority is still in doubt.
The determination of the Tribunal's officials to bring the high-
ranking indictees to justice41 is an encouraging signal that the
gross violations of the most elementary humanitarian laws are
not going unpunished, and that the suffering of civilians are not
once again disregarded. But it is also clear that the determina-
tion in the Hague alone is to no avail if it is not back by the
political leaders of the Member States. Through the individual-
ization of responsibilities, the population is purged from its col-
lective guilt that burdens its identity. Through the
differentiation between individual and collective responsibili-
ties the citizens of former Yugoslavia can start to process the
past and to create a future based upon mutual respect, or at
least mutual recognition of the suffered abuses. Without indi-
vidualization of guilt, there cannot be peace because "in order to
prevent a recurrence of mass violence, it is necessary to reveal
the way in which 6lites manipulated ethnic identity to foment
violence and consolidate political power."42 If the Tribunal is
going to succeed in its peace-building task, it is essential that
the ordinary citizens of the former Yugoslavia are able to see
that the roles of individuals in their commission of atrocities are
clarified and punished.
3. Deterrence
Another contribution of the Court to peace is deterrence.
Since many atrocities have been committed after its establish-
ment, the Court's very reason for existence has been put into
doubt, and its failures and shortcomings highly publicized.
Judging the need for the Court by its ineffectiveness in the pre-
vention of war crimes is, in my opinion, inappropriate. Who
would seriously criticize criminal courts at the national level
simply because crimes are still committed? Criminal law deals
with situations where all other political, economic and social
structures have failed. It is unrealistic to put these high expec-
tations to succeed on the Court where the rest of society has
failed. Only in this context is the Court's work to be assessed.
41 See Carla del Ponte, Press Release from the Prosecutor of the ICTY (Oct. 6,
2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p532-e.htm. (visited Oct. 21, 2000).
42 Akhavan, supra note 31, at 765.
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Regardless of what happened in Srebrenica and Kosovo,
specific and general deterrence through the work of the Court is
feasible. 'Specific deterrence' relates to the capacity of the crim-
inal system to deter individuals from the commission of future
crimes. In contrast, general deterrence refers to the capability
of the system to deter potential criminal behavior in the society
at large.43 To what extent fears of prosecution by the Court
could deter individuals in the former Yugoslavia is almost im-
possible to determine at this point. Although there is evidence
in some instances that threatening local political and military
leaders with prosecution have helped to improve the condition
of prisoners, specific deterrence has certainly not been appar-
ent.44 The modest deterring effect thus far is related to the fact
that hate and fear, as a result of the indoctrination campaign
that is continuing to date, are so pervasive, that many do not
even consider their own actions to be wrong. Recently, the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross conducted a survey in
Bosnia to ascertain whether the population was aware of the
content of the Geneva Conventions. 45 The survey indicated that
most citizens understood the meaning, but perceived the Bos-
nian conflict as a total war where the distinction between com-
batant and civilian barely existed. Ethnicity alone determined
the threat that justified a total mobilization against the enemy.
The limited specific deterrence has also been related to the
small number of prosecutions. In its seven years of existence,
the Court has only sentenced fifteen individuals, 46 a small fig-
ure compared to the number of war criminals in the area. Pro-
fessor Wippman accurately observed that "Iflor most offenders
... the risk of prosecution must appear to be almost equivalent
of losing the war crimes prosecution lottery."47 Combining the
motivations behind the violations with the lack of credibility as-
sociated with the warnings of punishment, it is evident why
43 See id. at 746 (explaining the distinction between specific and general de-
terrence).
44 See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FoRDFAM INT'L L. J., 473, 475 (1999).
45 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Country Report on Bosnia-
Herzegovina, available at http'// www.nt.oneworld.org/cfdocs/icredpages/reports/
pdfs/bosnia.pdf. (visited Oct. 21, 2000).
46 See ICTY Key Figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm. (vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2000). There were also two guilty pleas. See id.
47 Wippman, supra note 44, at 477.
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crimes continue to happen. Therefore, the best way to enhance
deterrence is to sharply increase the probability of prosecution
through more frequent trials. There are, however, considerable
logistical problems that the Court would face with a sharp in-
crease in prosecutions. 48 For this reason, the primarily focus
should be a consistent and credible effort by the permanent
Members of the Security Council to arrest the instigators of ha-
tred. Their prosecution not only deters future crimes, but
"reinvents and applies ... the concepts of responsibility, trans-
parency and accountability as issues central to the idea of limit-
ing government, and correspondingly limits the excesses that
are justified under the label of 'sovereignty.' ' 49 Their arrest
and prosecution is not only an issue of justice, but one that will
have important and long-lasting effects on the region's ability to
form a democratic state, institute market reforms, and accom-
plish social reconciliation.
Another role of justice is to foster 'general deterrence,' to
prevent criminal behavior in the society at large. This is the
most meaningful potential contribution that the Court can
make in the former Yugoslavia. The Court's role is to create a
serious prospect of accountability, and to convey the message
that ethnic cleansing, mass killings, systematic rape and other
atrocities are wrong, unjustified by any political and social plan,
and that they are not tolerated by the world community under
any circumstances. This message seems ridiculously obvious.
Unfortunately, a culture of impunity has dominated our primi-
tive society for so long a time that, in many countries, including
the permanent Members of the Security Council, past human
rights abuses are never investigated and the perpetrators are
left unpunished. 50 Thus, the Yugoslavia Court is the first es-
sential step towards the creation of a new culture of compli-
ance.51 As the Legal Advisor to the Court describes, "[Firom the
48 See Judge Claude Jorda, Press Release from the President of the ICTY H.E. .
(May 12, 2000), at http://www.un.org/ icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm. (visited
Oct. 21, 2000).
49 Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty Interna-
tional Criminal Law and the Ad-hoc Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INV'L L. 127, 158 (1995).
50 See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 76 (for an extensive discussion about the
"forgotten" war crimes).
51 Akhavan, supra note 31, at 742.
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criminal justice system emanates a flow of moral propaganda
such that punishment of the individual offender is transformed
into a means of expressing social disapproval [creating] "uncon-
scious inhibitions against crime, and... [establishing] a condi-
tion of habitual lawfulness" such that "illegal actions will not
present themselves 0 as real alternatives to conformity 0."52
With the establishment of the Tribunal, gross violations of hu-
manitarian law are, for the first time, systematically prose-
cuted, thereby upgrading humanitarian laws from empty words
to enforceable behavioral standards. Prosecution and punish-
ment of war criminals, within the framework of a judicial insti-
tution established by law, such as the Tribunal is the first,
critical step towards the internalization of new values that con-
form to the basic respect for human dignity. In reeducating the
local population about criminally unacceptable behavior, the
Tribunal can potentially bring about an eventual decrease in
criminal activity that will create an environment in which a
peaceful cohabitation of Serbs, Croats and Muslims becomes
possible. Yet, some authors seriously question the general de-
terrent effect of the Court.53 General deterrence is possible, but
it is a long-term proposition. To conclude that, after seven
years, the Court has failed in this task is therefore misplaced. I
strongly disagree with the opinion raised in the literature that
the Red Cross survey, showing that popular knowledge of the
Geneva Conventions did not avert human rights violations, is
an argument against the Court's contribution to general deter-
rence.54 At the time the atrocities were perpetrated, the Court
was just about to start its work, and considering the evident
lack of political will of the Court's founders to execute arrest
warrants, no one seriously expected to be prosecuted and to be
truly 'wrong'. Although the slowly growing number of arrests
through international forces is encouraging, whether the Court
will be able to transmit and contribute to the internalization of
new values will, in the long term, depend on the consistency of
international support for its work. Court's decisions help
anchor the knowledge of what is unacceptable, but police action
52 Id. at 746.
53 Wippman, supra note 44, at 486.
54 See id.
[Vol. 12:233
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/2
2000] THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 247
and prosecutions are also necessary to substantiate that
knowledge.
Finally, central to the deterrent effect of the Court is the
assurance that the local population has unfiltered media access
to the Court's proceedings. The media have a pivotal role in
eradicating structural violence and creating a peaceful society.
From the late 1980s throughout the 1990s, the media's influ-
ence and power were exemplified by the devastating effect of
the political propaganda in the media on the public conscious-
ness of former Yugoslavia. "The media represented the primary
tool of manipulation employed by leaders in this effort to arouse
inter-ethnic violence .... Distortions of truth, if not outright
misinformation, compounded by the cumulative effect of sys-
tematic indoctrination, generated a nationalist psychosis in
which reality was obscured."55 Accordingly, the Tribunal has
been repeatedly presented in the local media as a biased insti-
tution of the Western powers.5 6 If the Tribunal is at all to fulfill
its objectives of promoting security, reconciliation and
strengthen the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia, the work of
the Court needs to reach directly the ordinary citizens of the
region who are the ultimate peace-builders. Otherwise, the
Court's role in bringing peace to the area is seriously weakened.
In its efforts to ensure that its activities remain transparent
and accessible across the whole territory of the former Yugosla-
via, the Tribunal launched, in the fall of 1999, an outreach pro-
gram aimed at strengthening contacts between the Tribunal
and the communities in the region.57 Yet, it is obvious that not
only the Tribunal is responsible to make sure that its work is
understood. All States, and in particular the permanent Mem-
55 Akhavan, supra note 31, at 763.
56 See Michael Scharf, Indicted for War Crimes, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs opposed the creation of the Tri-
bunal (see a Letter Dated May 19, 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/48/170-
sf25801 (1993).
57 The ICTY Outreach Program has established regional offices in Banja
Luka, Sarajevo and Zagreb, which primarily operate in local languages. Additional
offices are planned in Belgrade and Pristina. For more information about the ICTY
Outreach Program see Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 54'
Sess., Item 53, Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1998/846, para. 146-151.
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bers of the Security Council, share responsibility for creating
the conditions necessary to facilitate the establishment of the
rule of law. The strengthening of the rule of law in the region is
mainly a political task for which the respective political will is
required. It might be true that financial contributions to the
ICTY Outreach Program are essential, 58 but they can also be
seen as an easy way out of the responsibility to meaningfully
support the Tribunal. For example, it would greatly support
the credibility of the Court's work if serious and credible efforts
were made to arrest the high level officials. So far, Member
States have only shown rhetorical determination.5 9 Although
NATO forces are well informed about the whereabouts of in-
dicted high-ranking officials, 60 no arrest action has been taken.
The recent political changes in the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via will possibly increase the likelihood of their arrest, but it is
also very likely that efforts to bring them to justice will continue
to be undermined by international and local political agendas.
Finally, another means of improving the Tribunal's reputation
in the former Yugoslavia is through private initiatives of Non-
Governmental Organization and local peace-building groups in-
volved in the creation of democratic structures.
C. Alternative Forms of Justice
Nonetheless, I want to emphasize that there are obvious
limits to what a criminal court can achieve. The peace building
and reconciliation process is multi-faceted, and criminal justice
is but one measure. It is obvious that the most effective mea-
sure is to stop the violations in the first place through effective
interventions of the world community.6 1 Even within the
framework of post-atrocities measures, however, alternative
58 After an initial contribution of $500,000 the United States recently contrib-
uted another $100,000 to the ICTY Outreach Program. See Press Release of the
ICTY (Oct. 11, 2000), at http'//www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p533-e.htm. (visited Oct.
21, 2000).
59 See Remarks by President Clinton on the Elections in Yugoslavia, The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Oct. 6, 2000), at http://
www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/10/10/6.text.2.
(visited Oct. 21, 2000).
60 See Bosnia War Crimes Suspect Kills Himself on Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2000.
61 See Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Ko-
sovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231 (1999).
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forms of justice must necessarily be integrated. As mentioned
before, criminal justice has some disadvantages. It can provide
limited satisfaction to victims. 62 In addition, investigations are
time-consuming. 63 Often it is difficult to find sufficient evi-
dence to justify indictment. Evidence is frequently tampered
with, or gets otherwise lost, so that many perpetrators escape
without penalty or public sanction.64 Under these circum-
stances, criminal justice could provide only little satisfaction to
victims. For this reason, a Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion that provides a detailed record of the history of violations,
establishing a consensus on abuses suffered by victims on all
sides, can be an important complement to the Court's work. A
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not a substitute for the
Tribunal, but a necessary additional institution furthering the
national reconciliation and healing process. No institution can
hold itself solely competent to find and expose the truth.65
Truth-finding and reconciliation, which eventually lead to
peace, require a multi-faceted approach. The importance of cre-
ating a common truth about the basic human tragedies suffered
by all parties in order to prevent another conflict cannot be
overestimated. A Truth Commission would provide a forum for
those thousands of victims that will never have an opportunity
to share their stories in a court of law. It is about creating an
historical record that both points out tragedies and heroic acts
of those ordinary citizens who resisted ethnic cleansing and
maintained their sense of humanity by demonstrating compas-
sion for others. It is about giving the conflict a human dimen-
sion, and understanding how former neighbors and friends were
driven to inflict such evil on one another. It could develop prac-
tical recommendations on how the recurrence of such atrocities
62 Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commis-
sions and International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L.A POL., 485, 491
(1995-1996).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 The former prosecutor of the ICTY, Louise Arbour, vehemently opposed the
creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
current Judges of the Court signaled their intention to adopt a position on the
possible creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia. See Press
Release of the ICTY, Oct. 13, 2000, at http'J/www.un.org/icty/pressrea]p535-e.htm.
(visited Oct. 21, 2000).
17
PACE INT'L L. REV.
can be avoided.6 6 It is about creating a credible and comprehen-
sive account of the gross abuses committed with the dual pur-
poses of giving the victims a basis to heal and of laying the
foundations for a democratic society.
The Tribunal is not addressing these issues as directly as a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission would be able to do. Con-
cerns of overlapping mandates between the Tribunal and a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the former Yugoslavia
are unjustified. With the creation of a victim-focused Commis-
sion the Tribunal is still solely responsible for prosecuting per-
sons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. The Court's function is primarily to bring to
justice the individual perpetrators, whereas the Commission's
function would be primarily to make precise and practical rec-
ommendations for the future on how violations of humanitarian
law can be avoided. Their mandates are therefore distinct.67
D. Tribunal's Challenges
The Court faces some serious problems that are limiting its
role in the restoration of peace. The most severe is the lack of
state cooperation in the enforcement of the Court's actions. 68
The Tribunal, unlike national courts, does not have an enforce-
ment mechanism of its own and therefore depends entirely on
States. Their cooperation and judicial assistance is critical for
66 See Alan L. Heil, Jr., Special Report, WASH. REP. ON MID. E. AFF. (citing
Richard J. Goldstone, former prosecutor of the ICTY, cited in a Special Report by
Alan L. Heil Jr. in the June 2000 issue of the Washington Report on Middle East
Affairs).
67 In bringing war criminals to justice, the Tribunal is confronted with its lim-
ited resources and an ever increasing number of indictees. See Report on the Oper-
ation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, presented
by the President of the ICTY H.E. Judge Claude Jorda, May 12, 2000, at http://
www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm (visited Oct. 21, 2000) (in which he
proposes several measures to speed up trial proceedings). The number of convic-
tions in The Hague compared to the number of offenders has been extremely low.
In addition, little progress has been made in addressing ethnic divisions. These
factors and the growing movement of NGO, intellectuals and victims' associations
of all ethnic groups in the last few years have created a more favorable environ-
ment towards the creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat-Serb Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For more on the proposed Commission in
Bosnia, see Heil, supra note 59. See also The United States Institute of Peace, Bos-
nia in the Balkans, Advancing the Rule of Law, at http://www.usip.orgoc/BIB/
bibrolfs.htm. (visited Oct. 21, 2000).
68 See Scharp, supra note 3; McDonald, supra, note 30, at 1429.
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gathering evidence and producing indictments, as well as for se-
curing custody of indicted persons. Many States have yet to es-
tablish the framework that would enable them to provide the
support mandated by international law.69 In particular, the
lack of cooperation of Croatia, and to a larger extent the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic Srpska, is seriously af-
fecting the Court. This is occurring even though their obliga-
tion to comply with requests and orders of the Court is well
founded both in the U.N. Charter 70 and in the Statute of the
Court. 71 It is still premature to say whether the recent political
changes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will improve
their cooperation with the Tribunal. Certainly, at this point the
priority of the Member States appears more to be to support the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its transition to democracy
then to pressure its government to cooperate with the Hague
and deliver Milosevic to the Tribunal. But even regardless of
the recent political developments in the former Yugoslavia, the
Member States have generally shown little interest in ensuring
that the orders of the Court are enforced. Illustrative is the re-
cent case of an indicted Serb general who quietly traveled to
Russia without being arrested. Russian officials downplayed
the event as an "internal dysfunction."72 State's apathy and
non-cooperation in the face of the atrocities committed are un-
acceptable. In the words of former President of the Court, Judge
McDonald, "[it is a crime not to act, but it is a greater crime to
say that you will act and then remain indifferent."7 3 If interna-
tional politics continues to override the requirements of inter-
national justice, the credibility of the Tribunal is at stake, and
its efforts to strengthen the rule of law and support the reconcil-
iation process are undermined. No additional legal measures
are necessary to bring about full compliance of all Member
States with the orders of the Court. It is only a matter of politi-
cal will.
69 See McDonald, supra note 30, at 1429.
70 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
71 See ICTY Statute, supra note 18, at art. 29.
72 Ojdanic Case, Meeting of Mr. Khodakov, Ambassador of the Russian Feder-
ation to the Netherlands, with the President of the ICTY, Press Release of the ICTY
N. 504 of May 25, 2000, at httpJ/www.un.org/ icty/pressreal/p504-e.htm. (visited
Oct. 21, 2000).
73 McDonald, supra note 30, at 1435.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Peace building in the former Yugoslavia is a long-term pro-
cess that requires a multi-faceted approach. Justice is an es-
sential element of securing an enduring peace in a transitional
society. There is no doubt that the establishment of the Yugo-
slavia Court has been vital. Norms of international humanita-
rian law have been substantially advanced through its work. It
has, for the first time, created a direct link between peace and
criminal justice. It has begun the long-term process of inter-
ethnic reconciliation. It has begun the long-term process of gen-
erating a culture of compliance. It has given rise to an interna-
tional resurgence of interest in humanitarian law that has
played a key role in the adoption of the statute of the perma-
nent International Criminal Tribunal. To enhance its role in
obtaining peace, the Court has to prosecute a sufficiently large
number of war criminals and, most importantly, the high-level
officials responsible for having planned the atrocities. To this
end, a credible and comprehensive factual support by all the
Member States is a minimum requirement. The Court is a seed
that needs to be watered if we want it to blossom. Moreover,
the work of the Court will be a testing ground for the efficacy of
the permanent International Criminal Court, which will hope-
fully increase the likelihood that war criminals will be brought
to justice, regardless of their nationality.
And what is our role in all of this? The misuse of national
sovereignty as a shield to prevent accountability and the glorifi-
cation of differences in ethnic conflicts are just a reflection of
what is happening in each human being. Only when we start to
humbly embrace the dark sides in us or, to use an expression of
Desmond Tutu,74 when we 'look the beast in the eyes', and begin
to focus on our shared fears and values rather than on our dif-
ferences, will we have made an essential contribution to the for-
mation of a new, enlightened collective consciousness where,
eventually, atrocities are no longer an option.
74 James Brittain, Desmond Tutu Interview Healing a Nation, reprinted in 25
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 39 (1996).
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